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T
he Deutsche Bundesbank was formed in July 1957, when the two-
tier central bank system set up following World War II was consoli-
dated.1 That previous system had been established by the Allies in
imitation of the Federal Reserve System and consisted of independent
regional banks (the Land Central Banks) and a governing body. Under the
new system, the Land Central Banks became offices of the Bundesbank.
As was true under the previous system, the Bundesbank was made inde-
pendent of the federal cabinet by law and was particularly proscribed
from lending to the public sector except for short terms. Acquisitions of
public debt occurred exclusively in the open market.2
Before the establishment of the European Central Bank, the operating
procedures of the Bundesbank included two lending facilities: the redis-
count facility, which provided loans at the discount rate, and Lombard
loans, at the Lombard rate, which generally was about 1.5 percentage
points above the discount rate. The discount rate was maintained below
market rates and discount credit was limited to a “rediscount quota.” The
discount rate acted as an approximate floor on market interest rates,
because banks could reduce their use of the discount facility when market
interest rates fell below the discount rate; however, the extent of substitu-
tion was limited by the amount of rediscounted bills coming due. The
Lombard rate, which was generally above market rates, acted as a ceiling
on market rates.30 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
Beginning in 1979–81, and with a marked increase
in 1985, the Bundesbank also engaged in repurchase
agreements to adjust the level of bank reserves. The
frequency with which these repurchase agreements
were offered rose over the years, while the maturity of
the agreements fell; by the late 1990s, they were
offered once a week with a two-week maturity.3 The
Bundesbank engaged in both variable-rate and fixed-
rate repos. The variable-rate tender allowed for a mar-
ket-determined interest rate outcome, while the fixed-
rate tender allowed the Bundesbank to provide a clear-
er signal of its policy stance.4
Permissible Assets
Instruments Eligible for Rediscount5
The Bundesbank was allowed to rediscount two
sorts of instruments: Treasury bills issued by the feder-
al government; and trade bills employed on the basis
of deliveries of goods or services, falling due within
three months and backed by three parties known to be
solvent, or two parties if the bill was insured in some
other way. In practice, the Bundesbank did not gener-
ally rediscount the Treasury bills of depository institu-
tions; instead, it either discounted the bills directly
with the Treasury or it bought them in the open mar-
ket. Foreign bills were purchased only if they had been
drawn on foreign trade transactions of a domestic
enterprise.
The rediscount quotas were based on a credit
institution’s capital, with adjustments for the extent to
which the institution held bills available for discount.6
In addition, the quotas were adjusted up or down by a
standard multiplier to achieve the aggregate level of
potential rediscounts desired by the Bundesbank.
Quotas were reduced if the credit institution was not
fully in compliance with supervisory standards for
capital and liquidity, or for other misconduct. At least
historically, the ability to restrict rediscount quotas
was an important regulatory tool of the Bundesbank,
perhaps explaining why the formulas for the quotas
remained opaque and judgmental.7 Quotas were gen-
erally fixed for one year.
Collateral for Lombard Loans8
Lombard loans were made against instruments
eligible for rediscount (Treasury bills and trade bills),
federal Treasury discount securities, other federal debt
securities, other debt securities deemed acceptable by
the Bundesbank, and equalization claims (claims on
the federal government that were granted to banks
and enterprises that experienced losses as a result of
the currency reform of 1948 and the monetary union
with the former Democratic Republic of Germany in
1990). Although the Bundesbank had earlier applied
haircuts, it had stopped doing so by the latter 1990s
because the collateral was all readily valued.
Securities Owned Outright9
The Bundesbank was allowed to buy and sell in
the open market the same securities that were eligible
for collateral for Lombard loans. At the end of 1997,
however, the Bundesbank owned no securities out-
right. The limited significance of securities owned out-
right was due in part to the limited markets for short-
term paper. These markets were to some extent inhibit-
ed by the availability of rediscount credit from the
Bundesbank for such instruments, as well as by both a
general aversion to shorter-term financial relation-
ships and the predominance of the universal banking
system.10 The primary short-term instrument bought
and sold by the Bundesbank was Treasury bills it itself
created, as was its right, for monetary policy purposes.
As for longer-term instruments, the Bundesbank was
not willing to buy private bonds and was generally
averse to buying public bonds. This aversion stemmed
in part from a desire to avoid the impression that “its
primary aim was to facilitate the financing of public
sector budget deficits…” and that “movements of
interest rates in [the bond] market were largely the
outcome of monetary policy measures and hence the
Bundesbank’s responsibility.”11
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Securities Eligible for RPs12
Securities that were eligible collateral for
Lombard loans and eligible for outright purchase
(Treasury bills, bills of exchange, federal securities,
and other private securities) were also eligible for
repo. The Bundesbank, in theory, engaged in repos
with all credit institutions that held reserves,
although, as is true in the Eurosystem, many credit
institutions likely did not choose to participate.
Beginning in 1973 the Bundesbank conducted repur-
chase agreements against bills of exchange eligible for
rediscount, but these were discontinued in 1984
because banks had virtually no bills in their portfolios
beyond what was necessary to fill their rediscount
quotas. The Bundesbank has engaged in repurchase
transactions in debt securities since 1979.
Foreign Assets13
As the official repository of the monetary reserve
in Germany, the Bundesbank held a large volume of
foreign exchange assets, particularly deposits and
short-term investments denominated in U.S. dollars,
and also gold. The Bundesbank also used the sale and
purchase of foreign exchange as an instrument of
monetary policy. The Bundesbank bought U.S. dollars
and simultaneously sold them forward in a “swap”
transaction. Such operations were used like repur-
chase agreements to fine-tune reserve supply and,
after 1979, not to influence foreign exchange rates.
The swap transactions were used to control reserve
supply at an even higher frequency than repurchase
agreements, although they were only rarely used in
the 1990s.14
Recent Distribution of Assets
At the end of 1997 the Bundesbank had assets of
DM 369.5 billion. Of these, the largest single amount
was loans to credit institutions, which accounted for 62
percent of assets. The largest category of loans was
securities purchased in open market repurchase agree-
ments, which accounted for 45 percent of assets. The
next largest item was discounted bills, which equaled
16 percent of assets, while Lombard loans equaled less
than 1 percent of assets. Almost all of the Bundes-
bank’s assets other than loans to domestic credit insti-
tutions were gold and international reserves, which
equaled 33 percent of assets. Among these, deposits at
foreign banks and investments in money market
investments abroad equaled 20 percent of assets,
claims on the European Monetary Institute equaled 6
percent of assets, and claims on the International
Monetary Fund and gold both equaled 4 percent of
assets.15
The percentage of assets that was rediscounted
bills declined sharply in the 1980s and 1990s from
three-quarters of Bundesbank lending to credit institu-
tions in 1980 to one-third in 1995, with the difference
more than made up for by repurchase agreements.16
Because rediscounting was done at a subsidy rate and
was allocated by quotas, it necessarily interfered with
competitive neutrality; largely for this reason, the
Bundesbank reduced the role of rediscounting.
Nevertheless, the Bundesbank continued to see “the
purchase of trade bills as being a reasonable means of
providing longer-term central bank money….”17
The Bundesbank indicated several reasons for its
shift toward repurchase agreements: Repos them-
selves were of short maturity and therefore offered a
high degree of operational flexibility for meeting
changing conditions in the financial markets, while at
the same time they allowed indirect access to German
banks’ large portfolios of longer-maturity fixed-
income securities.18 At the end of 1997, of the approxi-
mately DM 10 trillion on the books of German finan-
cial institutions, about 10 percent were securities
issued by German banks, 3 percent securities issued by
public authorities, and about 3 percent private securi-
ties issued by German enterprises other than banks.19
In addition, repos did not directly affect the prices of
the underlying securities. The Bundesbank only
engaged in repos against securities that were quoted
on a stock exchange for first or second segment trad-
ing.20 Repurchase agreements may therefore have
offered the Bundesbank a way to invest indirectly in
government debt without any risk of seeming to be
facilitating deficit finance, and they also allowed
access to the large volume of bank debt without direct-
ly holding longer-term private securities.
11 Deutsche Bundesbank, The Deutsche Bundesbank, Its Monetary
Policy Instruments and Functions, 1987, p. 71.
12 The Monetary Policy of the Bundesbank, p. 111.
13 The Monetary Policy of the Bundesbank, p. 32 and pp. 132–33.
14 Schmidt and Asche, p. 84.
15 “Bundesbank Monthly Report,” February 1998.
16 Schmidt and Asche, p. 81.
17 Schmidt and Asche, p. 81.
18 The Monetary Policy of the Bundesbank, p. 112, and Schmidt
and Asche, p. 83.
19 Deutsche Bundesbank, “The Monthly Report of the Deutsche
Bundesbank” (Statistical Section), June 2000, p. 20.
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Default Risk
Because the Bundesbank regularly rediscounted
private securities, it was subject to default risk.
Presumably that risk was significantly reduced by the
requirement mentioned above that all paper have mul-
tiple signatures. In 1997, 1.1 million domestic bills
totaling DM 276 billion were rediscounted. In the
absence of payments, 5,616 bills (0.5 percent) totaling
DM 142 million (0.05 percent) were returned and
charged to the parties presenting them. 21 That is, the
Bundesbank first sought payment from the issuer of
the paper, but failing that payment, debited the
account of the borrowing depository institution. At the
end of 1997, the Bundesbank had about DM 8 billion in
“provisions for other purposes,” which were for “gen-
eral risks inherent in domestic and international oper-
ations and doubtful liabilities….”22 Nevertheless, the
provisions were primarily for foreign exchange rate
risks, as the Bundesbank never experienced a failure of
payment on a rediscounted bill.
21 Deutsche Bundesbank, Annual Report 1997, p. 134.
22 Annual Report 1997, p. 172.